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Abstract 
In the light of a growing number of unstabilized regions of warfare or post-war conditions, 
this paper investigates how civilians survive in the context of a civil war. It analyzes 
livelihood strategies of farmers in the war-torn areas of Sri Lanka. The analytical framework 
is based on a revised form of DFID's sustainable rural livelihoods approach placing particular 
attention on the institutional reproduction of household capital assets in the war economy. The 
paper delineates a three pillar model of household livelihood strategies focusing on how 
households (i) cope with the increased level of risk and uncertainty, (ii) adjust their economic 
and social household assets for economic survival, and how they (iii) use their social and 
political assets as livelihood strategies. Empirically, the paper analyses four local case studies 
from the east of Sri Lanka. A key conclusion from the empirical studies was that even though 
the four case studies were located geographically very close, their livelihood outcomes 
differed considerably depending on the very specific local political geography. The role of 
social and political assets is thereby essential: While social assets (extended family networks) 
were important to absorb migrants, political assets (alliances with power holders) were 
instrumental in enabling individuals, households or economic actors to stabilize or even 
expand their livelihood options and opportunities. Hence, civilians are not all victims, some 
may also be culprits in the political economy of warfare. From a perspective of war-winners 
and losers, war can be both, a threat and an opportunity, often at the same time. 
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1 Introduction 
The literature on civil wars has paid considerable attention to the role of warlords, or war en-
trepreneurs, in establishing markets of violence (Elwert 1997) and war economies (Berdal and 
Malone 2000; Keen 1997, 1998). This was an essential element to explain that civil wars are 
not zones of anarchy or 'mad' behavior, but that rational war entrepreneurs have an interest to 
sustain warfare (Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Jean and Rufin 1999; Keen 1997). Much less at-
tention though has been paid to the analysis of livelihood strategies of the civilian population 
trapped in the war. In contrast to a widespread perception, civilian life does not cease in war-
affected areas. Wars do not create a vacuum, rather the civil population has to find a way of 
surviving in the context of a dramatic increase in risk and uncertainty, political instability, 
violence and economic decline. This paper investigates livelihood strategies of farmers and 
fishermen in the context of the Sri Lankan civil war and how these relate to the strategies of 
war-winners and war entrepreneurs. 
In the literature on the Sri Lankan civil war, such a bottom-up perspective to the conflict is 
largely missing (Goodhand et al. 2000). Among the few studies that discuss the socio-
economic conditions of the war zones, many have focused on the situation of internally 
displaced persons, staying either in refugee camps (Silva 2003), with relatives in Colombo 
(Sidharthan 2003) or having migrated abroad (Fuglerod 1999, Mcdowell 1996). O'Sullivan 
(1997) has investigated household entitlements on a broader scale in the war-affected regions 
of Sri Lanka. The study concludes that state welfare could prevent a large-scale collapse of 
household entitlements. However, his study does not go into depth with regard to the multiple 
ways in which households may safeguard entitlements. Goodhand et al. (2000) have 
investigated the impact of the political economy of war on social capital formation in peasant 
and fishing villages in Batticaloa district. They argue that one can observe a destruction of 
'bridging' (across ethnicities) and the creation of 'bonding' social capital (within one's own 
ethnic group). They also found a general decline of social cohesion in communities that were 
subject to terror and violence.  
Complementing and deepening the research of Goodhand et al., this study compares the 
livelihood strategies of four locations in the war-affected, multi-ethnic Trincomalee district in 
Sri Lanka. Here, many people have returned to their place of origin and have started some 
form of livelihoods during ongoing warfare. I compare livelihoods of different ethnic 
communities in various agro-ecological zones. However, all four cases have in common that 
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they are located in disputed areas with a great degree of random violence and instability. The 
findings suggest two propositions: first, livelihood strategies are deeply contextual and 
depend on the particular local political geography of war. Hence, we can observe a large 
variation of livelihood outcomes across the cases. Furthermore, from a perspective of war-
winners and losers, war can be both, a threat and an opportunity, often at the same time.  
2 Framework of Analysis 
The need to analyze poverty and vulnerability from a multi-disciplinary perspective has been 
increasingly recognized (Hulme and Shepherd 2003). This is particularly true for under-
standing the complex interplay among war, violence, vulnerability and livelihood strategies. 
The sustainable rural livelihoods (SRL) framework is a qualitative approach that seeks to un-
derstand relationships of social actors. The SRL is inspired by Sen's capabilities and entitle-
ment approach (Sen 1981, 1999) and understands a livelihood as the capabilities, assets (both 
material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living (Chambers and 
Conway 1992; Scoones 1998). In this study, the SRL approach is employed as a framework 
of analysis for the livelihood strategies of individuals and households in the context of war-
fare and how these strategies relate to those of local power holders.  
The major strength of the SRL framework is that it does not perceive people as vulnerable 
and helpless victims, but as dynamic actors, which adapt to trends and cope with shocks 
imposed through external conditions, their vulnerability context (Figure 1). Individuals 
dispose of six forms of assets (natural, physical, human, social, political and financial). These 
are the endowments available to an individual. A household's endowments then consist of the 
total productive resources of all members of a household. These are the potential resources a 
household has at hand to employ various sets of social, economic and political livelihood 
strategies to derive certain outcomes. These strategies are realized through the activities, 
assets and entitlements by which individuals capture their livelihood opportunities. Even 
under difficult circumstances, people may still be able to make a choice out of a bundle of 
options, and to access resources for their livelihoods activities. 
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Comments: N = natural capital assets; S = social capital assets; P = political capital assets;  
H = human capital assets; F = financial capital assets; Ph = physical capital assets. 
Figure 1: The Livelihood System 
Source: Department for International Development (DFID 1999), modified by the author 
The ways in which an individual may use these endowments is governed by institutions. Insti-
tutions, understood as 'rules of the game' (North 1990), influence and shape behavioral pattern 
and govern the coordination between different actors. These rules of the game determine who 
gains influence, access or control over which assets. Institutions, such as markets and legal 
restrictions, define the actual value of assets, and have a profound influence on the extent to 
which one asset can be transformed into other types of assets. Hence, institutions frame the 
entitlements of a household, i.e. its alternative sets of utilities derived from effective com-
mand over alternative assets. This determines the capabilities of a household to make a choice 
and derive certain livelihood outcomes.  
An institutional focus is essential to examine the degree to which households can influence 
decisions about endowments and entitlements. Entitlements, then, are the outcome of 
negotiations among social actors, involving power relations and debates over meaning (Gore 
1993; Watts 1991). While Sen's entitlement approach (Sen 1981) was concerned how 
individuals or households derive endowments and entitlements under a given legal 
framework, in times of civil war, "unruly" social practice (Gore 1993), direct power contests 
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and competing notions of legitimacy may bend the formal rules of law and informal rules sets 
to favor specific social actors.  
When institutions that can homogenize past observations and provide rules that stabilize 
coordination and expected behavior over time are weak or distorted by violent actors, 
households face risk that they can hardly calculate. Their exposure to crises, stress and shocks 
increases dramatically. This is the external dimension of household vulnerability. Sudden 
shocks in the form of violence superimpose a long-term trend of intimidation and economic 
decline. Households may have very limited ability to cope with the severe consequences of 
violence. Most vulnerable are often those who have limited access to assets (broadly defined) 
and limited abilities to respond to risk and uncertainty with often severe consequences, 
because this may increase the probability of experiencing a life-threatening loss in the future. 
This is the internal dimension of vulnerability (Alwang et al. 2001; Chambers 1989, Watts 
and Bohle 1993). 
The level of analysis in this study is the household level. Since most people live in 
households, household level analysis of behavior provides the most appropriate starting point 
for livelihood analysis: As Wheelcock and Oughton (1996) have argued the term, "individual" 
is misleading because it conjures up the idea of isolation from the social and historical setting. 
Nor does it distinguish between men and women and their particular relation within the 
household. Household level analysis does hence not outplay the questions of intra-household 
dynamics and specific vulnerabilities of individuals within the household. While the primary 
level of analysis is the household level, it is important to investigate the social and political 
links of households to networks in the wider community and beyond the own community. 
Hence, we have to include an analysis of the local political economy of warfare, because this 
cannot be separated from households' livelihood strategies. 
3 Material and Methods 
Qualitative research methods, with roots in anthropology and sociology, are particularly use-
ful in generating new insights into the processes involved in determining livelihood strategies 
and vulnerability. In addition, quantitative information, such as panel data sets, is often not 
available in civil wars or is out of date. Large sample surveys cannot be conducted under the 
conditions of a civil war due to logistical constraints, and sometimes for political reasons, 
since information can become part of the political struggle. On a practical level, researchers 
may face difficulties in gaining access to the research field (location, timing) due to insecu-
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rity, and they have to carefully select local research partners taking into consideration how 
these might be perceived by the research environment (biased, neutral?). In addition, local 
research partners need finely developed skills in the 'politics of an interview', in particular 
how they can raise sensitive issues without intimidating the interviewees. To great extent, 
conducting empirical research 'in' conflict requires adapting existing methods to the specific 
circumstances (Goodhand 2000).  
The empirical investigation was carried out in Sri Lanka by a German-Sri Lankan research 
group in the period of July to October 2001. The team selected four case studies in the 
Trincomalee district, which is in the east of Sri Lanka in the Northeast Province (NEP). This 
district is particularly affected by war and destruction and is inhabited by all three ethnic 
groups (Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims). For the household and village level survey, the 
research team employed qualitative research methods based on Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) 
techniques, because such methodology is best suited to grasp the volatile mechanisms of 
people’s survival strategies in general. The cases were selected to represent different poverty 
levels, agro-ecological clusters, and ethnic groups. Small sub-teams of the group conducted 
semi-structured interviews with individuals, focused group discussions, transect walks, and 
employed other RRA tools where appropriate, e.g. mapping exercises.  
The line of investigation followed the logic of the SRL frame and the concept of 
vulnerability. While the team followed a tentative checklist of questions, the interviews were 
kept flexible in flow. This is essential to react smoothly to situations where the interviewees 
feel at unease about particular topics or questions, e.g. related to the role of war entrepreneurs. 
Each case study was carried out by two sub-teams. The results of the field investigations of 
the different sub-teams were regularly discussed, compared, and new hypotheses derived for 
the consecutive investigations. The information was cross-checked with resource persons and 
other available evidence, such as project and consultancy reports. Further information was 
gathered from formal and informal interviews with the field staff of the Integrated Food 
Security Programme Trincomalee (IFSP) that supported and accompanied the field studies.1 
                                                 
1  The results of the field studies are documented in village and cross-cutting reports that can be downloaded at 
http://www.ifsp-srilanka.org , the website of the Integrated Food Security Programme Trincomalee (IFSP). The reports 
also include a list of resource persons and families interviewed and the research methods utilized. The co-researchers and 
agencies involved in this study are in no way responsible for the analysis pursued here, even though I have deeply 
benefited from their ideas, contributions and critical comments. See the acknowledgments for the names of the 
researchers involved in the village studies whose valuable contributions are here, again, gratefully stressed. 
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4 Case Studies 
4.1 History of warfare in the east of Sri Lanka 
Since 1983, Sri Lanka has been affected by an 'ethnic' conflict escalated into civil war. At first 
sight, the war is fought over the claim of the Tamil minority for an independent homeland in 
the northeast of the island. On the one hand, there are the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), a brutal rebel organization, fighting for Tamil Eelam (the homeland). The govern-
ment, politically dominated by the Sinhalese majority, seeks to protect the integrity of the 
"Sinhala" nation, and has deployed a large amount of troops to fight it out against the separa-
tist movements, in particular the LTTE. However, one should better call Sri Lanka a 'conflict 
cocktail', since various levels of conflict and lines of inter- and intra-ethnic dissent occur and 
have lead to escalation of violence.2 The civil war between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
armed forces has mainly taken place in the northeast, that is predominantly inhabited by 
Tamils, and also by Sinhalese and Muslims.3 This analysis investigates livelihood strategies of 
civilians in the context of war, especially of those farming and fishing households who were 
left behind in the rural economy of the war-affected northeast struggling to survive in their 
traditional livelihoods.  
I have selected the district of Trincomalee for field studies, because it represents a very 
diverse cosmos of different agro-ecological zones and ethnic groups. Trincomalee is a multi-
ethnic district positioned at a strategic location between the north and the east of Sri Lanka. 
Trincomalee disposes of a big natural harbor and is the proclaimed capital of a Tamil Eelam, 
the independent Tamil homeland demanded by LTTE. The population ratio between the three 
ethnic groups is a politically contentious issue with currently roughly one third of the district 
population belonging to each of the three main ethnic community (Tamil, Muslims, Sinha-
lese). The Sinhalese largely live in the cultivation and colonization areas of recent origin (last 
50 years) close to the interior of the country, while Tamil and Muslim villages are living in 
close proximity to each other mainly at the coastal strips (mostly in traditional villages, but 
also in recent settlement schemes).  
                                                 
2  For detailed accounts of the civil war, see Mayer et al. 2003; Spencer 1990 and Rotberg 1999, where further detailed 
references are available.  
3  In Sri Lanka, the Muslim community take their religion as criteria for ethnicity and incorporate it in group naming, 
political organization etc. They are normally defined as third major ethnic group, besides Sinhalese and Tamils (Wagner 
1990). 
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Warfare in the district has been extremely dividing with both conflict parties, the Sri 
Lankan armed forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) pitting the 
communities living there against each other (O’Sullivan 1997). Violence in the east was not 
limited to fighting between the government and the LTTE, but also included sporadic clashes 
with other communal groups, especially in the early 1990s between the Tamil and Muslim 
populations (Goodhand and Lewer 1999). Though the civil war worsened in the other districts 
of the northeast from 1990, Trincomalee district had already experienced many sporadic 
clashes between Tamil and Sinhala communities since the 1980s. More recently, there have 
been several communal riots between Tamils and Muslims, in particular after the recent 
ceasefire agreement between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. These clashes show 
the deep mistrust between the different ethnic groups that has remained deeply embedded in 
the consciousness of people even though people from different ethnic groups, in particular 
Tamils and Muslims that live adjacent to each other, may trade or exchange goods with each 
other and cultivate neighboring fields. 
4.2 Background of the four case studies 
The four case studies reflect the diversity of the district in agro-ecological, economic, social 
and cultural terms (see Table 1). All four case studies are located at or are close to the border-
line between uncleared (or ‘grey’) and cleared areas.4 This implies an increased level of un-
certainty due to the frequent incidences of fighting, violence, and intimidation and the pres-
ence of the armed groups in the conflict. Households thus have to cope with and adapt to a 
high risk level which decreases economic opportunities and influences investment choices. 
Broadly speaking, the psychological effects are reported to be striking even though there are 
few concise studies about these:5 a lack of self-confidence, a tendency to keep a low profile, 
frustration in view of limited life opportunities, fear and desperation are widespread in these 
areas of increased vulnerability. The common feature in all four locations is thus the lack of 
stability. 
                                                 
4  ‘Uncleared’ area denotes those territories under the control of the LTTE. Entrance to these areas was until the recent 
ceasefire agreement subject to approval from the Ministry of Defense. In Trincomalee, however, many areas were ‘grey’ 
or ‘semi-cleared’ areas of disputed territory subject to constant instability and sporadic violence. 
5  For some literature on the psycho-social effects of the war, see Somasundaram (1998), Samaraweera (2003). 
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Table 1: Village Sketches 
 Ithikulam  
[I] 
Kalyanapura 
[Ka] 
Kumpurupitty 
[Ku] 
Vattam  
[Va] 
Vulnerability 
Context 
Tamil community 
in uncleared area; 
dilapidated public 
infrastructure 
 
Sinhalese border 
village 
Tamil settlement in 
‘semi-cleared’ area; 
onion boom. 
Muslim border 
village at coastal 
strip 
Main income 
sources 
Highland cultiva-
tion, wage laboring 
 
Paddy cultivation, 
home guards, wage 
labor 
Wage laboring, onion 
cultivation, land lease 
Fishing,  
middle east em-
ployment 
Social and 
political as-
sets 
Gradually regaining 
social assets 
through financial 
assets, no political 
assets. 
Strong social network 
(farmer organization) 
and political assets 
(military, clergy, 
politicians) 
 
Decline in social rela-
tions and fear to expose 
oneself politically. 
Good social rela-
tions (mosque 
society), but reluc-
tance to build po-
litical assets.  
Livelihood 
outcomes:  
 
Key trends 
 
Converting threats 
into opportunities:  
Though from low 
social origin, peo-
ple have estab-
lished relatively 
stable livelihoods 
based on highland 
cultivation that 
secures them a 
regular income. 
Fragile prosperity at 
the fringe of power:  
Though army, police 
and government pro-
vide protection and 
economic support, the 
political situation is 
shaped by a high 
threat of attacks by 
the Tamil rebels. 
Missing the onion 
boom: Although there 
are encouraging eco-
nomic incentives, vil-
lagers are careful to 
invest into onion culti-
vation due to high 
political instability and 
lack of confidence. 
Squeezed between 
the lines: Being 
posited between 
the lines of navy 
and LTTE, fisher-
men of Vattam 
avoid large-scale 
investment in fish-
ing and live from 
remittances of 
relatives working 
abroad. 
 
Source: compiled from Korf et al. (2001) 
Conflict, war and risk, nevertheless, have quite a different impact on each of the four research 
locations (Table 1). In some locations, villagers still pursue their traditional livelihood activi-
ties and farming systems, even though under constraining frame conditions. In other loca-
tions, the conflict forced villagers to leave traditional resources behind due to the war and to 
search for alternative livelihood options. Hence, we can observe a large variation of livelihood 
outcomes across cases. The main observations with regard to the specific local vulnerability 
context, general livelihood strategies and outcomes are briefly described along the four case 
studies. 
In Ithikulam, a Tamil village in the uncleared (i.e. rebel controlled) area, farmers converted 
the security threat into new opportunities: initially, these farmers were forced to leave their 
original village that was located in the combating lines of army and rebels. Most of these 
households left their traditional livelihood (paddy cultivation) behind and now earn 
considerable cash income from highland cultivation (vegetables) and wage laboring on the 
fields of paddy farmers in the cleared areas. In the traditional Tamil society, paddy cultivation 
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is socially considered to be superior to other agricultural activities and laboring, and some 
households at first experienced a social decline. However, in effect, some of these households 
now are economically more successful in their livelihood strategy than traditional tenant 
paddy cultivators in adjacent villages, because the latter suffer from high costs of cultivation 
inputs. Due to the restricted mobility of goods across the borderline between cleared and 
uncleared area, all agricultural inputs for paddy cultivation are substantially more expensive 
in uncleared areas. As one outcome, we can observe that some households from Ithikulam 
have used their new financial assets to build houses in their former traditional village to re-
establish social recognition in their places of origin. The new houses are mainly used as 
dowry for marriage, which provides substantial social and financial security for the bride. 
Villagers in Kalyanapura, a Sinhalese settlement village at the borderline, are subjected to 
frequent attacks from the rebels. Originally, these settlers were paddy cultivators in irrigated 
schemes. Those households that remained in the area during war are able to ensure a 'fragile 
prosperity at the fringe of power': state and military support provides about one third of the 
households with new income sources. One important new income source is home guard 
employment which corresponds to a village run, but government funded, security service 
against rebel attacks. While this makes many households financially better off compared to 
peaceful times, they live in a highly unstable political environment and are constantly under 
threat of attack.  
Kumpurupitty is a Tamil village in an officially cleared area. In reality, however, this area 
is ‘grey’ and disputed and fighting is frequent between army, navy and the rebels in sudden, 
sometimes hidden forms. This makes the vulnerability context even less predictable than in 
other locations. Households in Kumpurupitty have been displaced several times in the past 
and they have lost access to their traditional livelihoods: they are afraid to go to their paddy 
fields located outside of the village close to the jungle and the lagoon, where a lot of military 
movements and fighting occurs. After returning, households are also reluctant to engage in 
new, promising agricultural ventures: the area has a good potential for the highly profitable 
onion cultivation which emerges as overriding new livelihood opportunity in the area. In 
Kumpurupitty, most households with own land prefer to lease it out to farmers from adjacent 
villages instead of investing themselves. Deeply suspicious what the future will bring, they 
are reluctant to invest scarce financial assets that they may loose if they are forced to flee 
again or lose it due to illegal taxation by the rebels. Instead, they live from the income of the 
land lease and work as wage laborers, often on their own land. The livelihood outcome 
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encountered is twofold: households earn immediate cash income, though on a limited scale, 
while outsiders may reap the profits from the onion boom.  
Vattam is a Muslim fishing village that is situated close to the borderline to uncleared area 
which places it in a precarious political vulnerability context. In their general livelihood 
strategies, households and local leaders in this location prefer to keep a low profile in 
economic and political terms, because they seem to be trapped between the two fighting 
parties, the LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces. In the past, rebels stole fishing boats, the 
army continues to restrict locations and timing of fishing. Many households therefore do not 
invest in fishing anymore. They derive income mostly from remittances of relatives working 
abroad and are eager to hide their real income to outsiders, because apparent wealth may 
invite rebels to extract taxes forcefully from them.  
Even though all case studies were situated in politically unstable locations, the general 
trends of livelihood outcomes in these four examples show the variety of contexts and 
responses to the circumstances. This indicates that a generalization of findings is very diffi-
cult: There are certain livelihood strategies which are common to all four locations, while 
others are typical for a particular community only. This diversity in livelihood strategies and 
outcomes demonstrates the complexity of the vulnerability context and shows that it cannot 
be understood as a mono-causal feature shaped solely by the war. The vulnerability context is 
rather the product of an interplay of different factors and its impact differs according to the 
capital assets of a household. In addition, while the war has meant a serious threat to local 
livelihoods in some locations (Kumpurupitty), it has also offered some opportunities in others 
(Ithikulam, Kalyanapura).  
When looking at livelihood strategies in the war zones, it is important to keep in mind that 
it is largely the poor that are forced to remain residing in the rural areas of the war zones. In 
Tamil society, the richer households can use their financial assets and their contacts, resources 
and an expanding Tamil Diaspora network to migrate out to safer areas, in particular to 
Colombo (Sidharthan 2003) and foreign destinations (Fuglerod 1999, Mcdowell 1996). This 
selective out migration of the rich left behind the poor to fight it out with the security forces 
and to liberate the so-called "homeland" (Eelam). For example, in the adjacent villages of 
Kumpurupitty, one of the study areas, the former rural elite of coconut plantation owners have 
all left to go abroad or to Colombo. Similarly, in Sinhalese border villages, better off farmers 
tend to leave the area and live with relatives in more peaceful areas of Sri Lanka. Only within 
the Muslim community, this trend seems to be less pronounced, because Muslims in the east 
and Muslims elsewhere in Sri Lanka do not have close family links. 
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4.3 Coping with war: internal strategies 
Of those who are forced to remain in the war zones, what are the particular livelihood strate-
gies that they adopt to cope with political instability and to adapt to economic degradation? 
Table 2 outlines some common strategies that could be observed in the four research loca-
tions. In the table, livelihood strategies are categorized according to three pillars (see above): 
managing personal risk of life looks particularly at the strategies to respond to political vio-
lence, hence to the specific vulnerability context of war. The second pillar, managing house-
hold economics, refers to how households organize financial, human and physical assets 
within the household to secure income, to organize the family and to manage expenditure and 
investment (see sec. 4.3). While the second pillar looks into internal arrangements within the 
households, the third pillar, accessing external support, investigates what external relations 
households develop for their livelihood strategies. It covers the field of social and political 
assets and how households may utilize these to influence, access and control institutions (see 
sec. 4.4, 4.5). The signatures in brackets signify in which locations the particular strategies 
have been observed. 
In responding to political instability and warfare (first pillar), households develop a 
remarkable spatial mobility. Apart from the rich who often migrate out altogether (see above), 
even the poor may temporarily be forced to leave their homes. However, in the latter case, this 
is often an immediate response to sudden eruption of violence whereas the rich leave the area 
much earlier when political instability abounds. When fighting occurs in close proximity, 
poor households may flee into the jungle or to relatives in adjacent villages. They will return 
as soon as the political situation allows them to come back, because they depend upon their 
livelihoods and small assets they may have had to leave behind. The poor often do not have 
the choice to give up their livelihoods and those who are forced to do so often end up in 
refugee camps (Silva 2003). For example, in Kalyanapura, some better off farmers reside with 
relatives outside of the village, whereas the poorer farmers largely have returned after being 
temporarily displaced. However, also those farmers not living in the village, may return for 
specific months in the year to cultivate their fields, because they depend on them as their 
means of livelihood.  
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Table 2: Three Pillars of Livelihood Strategies 
Managing personal risk  Managing household econom-
ics 
Accessing external support 
Minimising risk 
• leaving places of residence 
or cultivation permanently or 
temporarily [all], 
• fleeing to the jungle during 
sudden eruption of fighting [I, 
Ka], 
• residing with relatives in the 
peaceful areas of Sri Lanka 
and returning for cultivation 
only [Ka], 
• sending children to relatives 
in more secure places for 
schooling and safety [all], 
• sending women and elderly 
persons through checkpoints 
for marketing, because young 
men are more likely to become 
harassed [I], 
• working in fields in groups 
and seeking protection by the 
army [Ka]. 
 
Risk taking (for economic sur-
vival): 
• collecting firewood in the 
jungle even though this is a 
very risky place [I], 
• trespassing in the restricted 
fishing areas imposed by the 
navy, when fishermen expect a 
big catch of fish [Va]. 
 
Securing income: 
• migrating for income opportuni-
ties to Middle East [all, Va], 
• confining to key income sources 
due to reduced life choices [Ka, Ku, 
Va], 
• seeking home guard employment 
for Sinhalese farmers [Ka], 
 
Organising the family: 
• handling traditional gender roles 
and tasks more flexibly: women 
take a more active role in market-
ing, trading and cultivation [I], 
• re-sizing and re-uniting the fam-
ily according to security and eco-
nomic needs, e.g. sending vulner-
able family members to more se-
cure places [all]. 
 
Managing expenditure and invest-
ment: 
• avoiding investment in tangible 
assets (e.g. boats, houses) [Ku], 
even though in two locations, peo-
ple started building new houses 
[Va, I], 
• reducing expenses for entertain-
ment and consumption patterns 
[all]. This is often coupled with a 
partial degrading social status. 
 
Seeking refuge in the wider family 
network(see also first pillar): 
• sending family members to 
relatives living in more peaceful 
areas of Sri Lanka [all], 
• residing temporarily with rela-
tives outside of the war zones 
[Ka] 
 
Alliancing with power holders 
(active): 
• establishing good relationships 
with local government officers 
[Ka, Ku, Va], 
• seeking alliances with armed 
actors to get personal advan-
tages (e.g. for trading) [Ka], 
• keeping a low profile in order 
not to cause trouble [I, Va] 
 
Satisfying claims of armed actors 
(passive): 
• giving the necessary as bribe 
(in avoidance of being forced to 
give) [I, Ku], 
• by-passing taxation and bribery 
wherever possible with tricks 
etc. [I, Ku] 
 
Qualifying for state and NGO sup-
port: 
• forming community-based 
organizations to access NGO 
support [Ka], 
• concealing economic facts 
in order to qualify for state or 
NGO welfare [Va, Ku]. 
 
 
Comments: I = Ithikulam; Ka = Kalyanapura; Ku = Kumpurupitty; Va = Vattam 
Source: compiled from Korf et al. (2001) 
In addition, households may re-shuffle the internal organization of the household. This is 
partly a direct response to the high political risk (first pillar), partly a re-arrangement of 
household assets in response to economic degradation (second pillar): Families are re-sized 
and re-united according to security and economic needs. For example, individuals who are 
particularly vulnerable to political violence, are going to more secure places outside of the 
war zones. Most vulnerable are often young Tamil men, because they face a twofold threat: 
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on the one hand, the army may suspect them of being a rebel, on the other hand, the rebels 
may put pressure on families to recruit young men into their ranks. In all locations, some 
households have sent children to relatives in more secure places for schooling and to get them 
out of the risky environment. These 'refugees' place an additional burden on the hosting rela-
tives outside of the war zones, who are often only remotely related to the person they host. 
Households thus depend on their social assets within the extended family network. Many of 
the poorest of the poor do not dispose of such social assets, because their relatives are evenly 
destitute as they are and cannot provide living costs for relatives and their relations may 
equally be trapped in the war zones, because they also lack the financial assets to migrate out.  
Within the household, responsibilities and gender roles may change and women may have 
to take a more active role in economic affairs, in particular in Tamil society. In Ithikulam, for 
example, many households have decided to send women and elderly to pass through army 
checkpoints when agricultural produce is brought to the markets outside of uncleared area. 
Young Tamil men are particularly vulnerable to detention, by the army, because they may be 
suspected to be rebels. They are thus afraid to pass army checkpoints, in particular during 
times of increased political tension. This strategy remains, however, a last resort, because 
many young men need to earn income as wage laborers in the paddy cultivation areas in 
cleared area. The increasing importance of women in marketing activities has two effects: on 
the one hand, women gain a more active role and greater independence, however, there are 
also reports that indicate an increase in domestic violence, alcoholism because the husbands 
feel frustrated about their lost caring role as household head (Silva 2003). 
Work in the fields is often a particularly vulnerable activity in the highly contested areas: 
they are often close to jungle areas where rebels have a stronghold and villagers are afraid to 
go there for cultivation. In Kumpurupitty, households have lost some of their most basic 
livelihood asset: the paddy fields that are located in very insecure areas with military 
movements. In Kalyanapura, farmers organize themselves, and under the protection of the 
army, they work in groups on the field that provides them with some feeling of being 
protected.   
While these strategies sought to minimize risk, there are some cases where people 
deliberately took risky, adventurous livelihood activities: In Vattam, some fishermen 
navigated to restricted areas where the navy does not allow fishermen to go, when they expect 
a good catch in these areas. Some of them have lost their lives or were seriously injured when 
navy boats fired on them suspecting them of being 'sea tigers' (rebels). In Ithikulam, it were 
very destitute families that had to take a great risk and send children to collect firewood in the 
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nearby jungle to sell it later. The jungle in this area is known as insecure area because jungle 
provides cover for combatants from both, army and rebels. They penetrate these areas and 
often fight each other. For these reasons, the rebels have forbidden civilians to enter the jungle 
and will punish those they find there.  
Some of the above strategies of managing risk (first pillar) overlap with those of managing 
household economics (second pillar), in particular the re-organization of families. In addition, 
households have to adapt their economic survival strategies to the declining economic 
opportunities. In contrast to prior expectations of the research team, households did often not 
diversify their livelihoods, a strategy often observed in naturally risky environments (Ellis 
1998). Instead, households showed a tendency to confine their livelihood activities to some 
key income source. In some cases, this was because they found only limited choices and 
livelihood options: In Kumpurupitty and Vattam, households were restricted in the access to 
their traditional resources, in the former case, paddy fields, in the latter the marine fishing 
resources. For many households in all research locations, remittances from family members 
working abroad, mainly the middle east, have become a major income source that stabilizes 
household income and allows to replenish lost assets.6 
In some instances, households were forcibly restricted to limited livelihood options, in 
other cases, alternative income sources available through the war economy opened alternative, 
more lucrative income sources. In Kalayanapura, for example, many young men can work as 
home guards for the state and receive a regular salary that exceeds the amount of cash they 
could earn from agricultural activities. Many of those households therefore do not see a need 
to diversify their livelihoods further: they cultivate paddy fields and rely on the cash income. 
This massive, artificial inflow of cash into the village economy causes distortions and 
increases regional disparities across ethnic lines, because home guard employment is only 
offered to Sinhalese men (and to a lesser degree to some Muslim men).  
The risky environment and limited livelihood options also influence how households 
manage investment and expenditure, even though the observation may differ substantially 
from location to location: In all locations, respondents were more reluctant to spend money 
for entertainment, cultural festivities and consumption in general. Where households have 
financial assets for investment, they often invest in moveable items, such as jewels rather than 
in assets that cannot be hidden or taken when migrating. In Kumpurupitty, for example, 
                                                 
6  However, this trend is not confined to the war-affected areas. In large parts of rural Sri Lanka, households depend on 
remittances from relatives abroad (Dunham and Edwards 1997). 
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households are extremely reluctant to invest financial assets into tangible assets or cultivation: 
they do neither invest in refurbishing their houses nor in onion cultivation. In Vattam and 
Ithikulam, however, even though these locations are also in areas of high risk, people 
refurbish houses, in Ithikulam, some households even build new houses in their traditional 
village to re-establish their social status in their places of origin, even though these were 
located in unstable areas.  
4.4 Using political assets (third pillar) 
Households also access external support in the form of social and political networks. Social 
networks seem to be particularly important for those who are sent outside of the war zones, 
because they depend upon the support of an extended family network, as has been discussed 
above. Within the war zones, however, social networks often do not help much, because 
neighboring households face the same impediments to livelihood options which they cannot 
overcome by collective action. In particular for economic activities that involve spatial mobil-
ity (trading), civilians need close alliances with political and military power holders. Here, we 
can distinguish an active and a passive strategy: most households are in one form or another 
forced to satisfy claims of armed actors in the form of taxes and petty bribes, because these 
are enforced on them: The rebels extract taxes from farmers of all three ethnic groups. The 
checkpoint system imposed by the army and navy offers potential for petty bribes: army sol-
diers expect bribes from civilians that want to transport tradable goods through checkpoints. 
These are largely passive strategies necessary in order to survive.  
In addition, there are some households and economic actors that follow a much more pro-
active strategy of forming alliances and networks with political and military power holders. 
Access to power holders depends largely on ethnicity. For example, Muslim traders in many 
areas of Trincomalee district dominate commerce, because they have formed alliances with 
military power holders that allows them to pass checkpoints without disturbance, an advan-
tage not granted to Tamil traders who are always under suspicion of supporting the LTTE. 
Muslim traders are in a comparative advantage because they traditionally have trading links 
with Tamil farmers because of the multi-ethnic Tamil-Muslim settlement pattern in the east, 
and they can cooperate with Sinhalese military. Tamil traders hardly can form alliances with 
Sinhalese military and Sinhalese traders would be too afraid to travel to Tamil areas where the 
rebels may exercise some control.  
But even on a smaller scale, households seek alliances with power holders. On a local 
level, this includes establishing good relationships with local office holders, which is a 
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common phenomenon in the clientele society of Sri Lanka (Spencer 1990). These include 
better access to potential jobs, fund allocation of the state for village development and access 
top state welfare. Kalyanapura is a case where households and their village leader dispose of 
strong political assets in the form of relations with the top administrator in the district, a 
Sinhalese, the influential Buddhist clergy, the armed forces and the police. For example, the 
local farmer leader, an old man with strong links to the district head administrator and the 
influential Buddhist clergy was able to force lower level administrators to alienate land titles 
to members of his farmer organization against the prescription of existing legal procedures. 
The alliances of Sinhalese civilians with a politico-military complex of the state has become 
so close, because the central government has an interest to support Sinhalese settlers that they 
remain residing in the northeast, in particular in border villages to underline the political 
claims of the "Sinhala nation". Hence, this political strategy of the state opens up new 
opportunities for households and community-based organizations in Kalyanapura to get 
additional welfare, job opportunities and other political favors.   
In other places, however, households do not dispose of such political assets. In Vattam, 
Kumpurupitty and Ithikulam, households prefer to keep a low profile, try not to cause trouble 
and to remain unnoticeable to the fighting parties. They thus cannot develop political assets 
and local leaders will be reluctant to expose themselves. Since Ithikulam is located in 
uncleared area, households have very limited options to access state support. In Vattam, 
households are reluctant to form alliances with either rebels or military because they feel 
trapped in between both parties. And any sign of getting closer to one side may cause 
detrimental action from the other side. In Kumpurupitty, territory is so contested between the 
two fighting parties that civilians hide away behind a low economic and social profile. 
In addition, it is essential to note that political assets can be best used by those who are 
already at the upper part of the social ladder within their social community. For example, in 
Kalyanapura, it was in particular the farmer leader that had a close alliance with the regional 
political network. Among the Muslim communities, it is mainly the Mudhalalis, the local 
traders, that build alliances with army officers to carry out their trade, while 'simple' Muslim 
farmers and fishermen may lack this access power holders in the military.  
4.5 Links between social and political assets (third pillar) 
There is no coherent picture across the four cases with regard to social cohesion within vil-
lages. Kalyanapura (Sinhalese) had a strong farmers organization and an old farmers leader 
with a high internal reputation and strong political alliances with power holders. The Buddhist 
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clergy plays an influential role in establishing links between power holders and local residents 
in the Sinhalese constituency. Most of the households that remained living in Kalyanapura 
thus had both, strong social cohesion and strong collective political assets. In Vattam, Islam 
provided some unifying theme with mosque leaders being influential in village life. The 
mosque also established some welfare system to help the destitute in the village. However, 
households were reluctant to develop political alliances with either of the conflict party.  
In Ithikulam and in Kumpurupitty, both Tamil villages, social cohesion has deteriorated as 
a result of displacement and economic decline: Households in Ithikulam settled there after 
leaving their original homes and often originate from poor families. They rather seek to 
establish links to adjacent traditional villages because this seems to promise more social 
recognition. Politically, these households are very careful in 'keeping a low profile' and most 
dispose of virtually no political assets. Only very few households have sought some link with 
the rebels and may be rewarded for this with particular benefits, e.g. the possibility to trade 
with fuel wood. Kumpurupitty is the research location that suffers most from violence and 
intimidation because it is highly contested between the navy (that has a reputation of being 
particularly 'tough') and the rebels. Here, households are deeply distrustful, because there may 
be collaborators from either side in their community. Hence, social assets are confined to the 
closer family networks, whereas households are reluctant to use political contacts because this 
poses them in a dangerous position towards the other conflict party. This situation may also 
explain why households in Kumpurupitty are extremely reluctant to invest in cultivation. 
State welfare and support from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is an essential 
source of livelihood. In Vattam, Kumpurupitty and Ithikulam, households conceal their 
economic facts in order to remain eligible for food stamps, a basic welfare scheme of the Sri 
Lankan state. Since most NGOs largely work through community-based organizations, those 
groups of households that organize themselves in such forms have higher probability to 
capture NGO benefits. At the two extremes are Kalyanapura and Ithikulam: In Kalyanapura, 
households were well organized in community-based organizations to approach NGOs and 
receive state welfare, while in Ithikulam, there was no single local organization.  
Considering social and political assets of households across ethnic communities, there are 
two dominating strategies that can be identified. Sinhalese civilians often profit economically 
from the strong political backing of the Sri Lankan government. The Sinhalese settlers in the 
northeast are at the frontier of the political claims of the integrity of the Sri Lankan state: as 
long as there is a considerable number of Sinhalese settlers living in the northeast, the 
government can downplay the legitimacy of Tamil demands for a homeland covering the 
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whole north and east (Bastian 1995). While Sinhalese civilians thus gain economic 
opportunities from this support, it often places them into a threatening position politically, 
since the alliance of Sinhalese civilians with the armed forces provokes the military response 
from the Tamil rebels. Muslims, on the other hand, seek to balance their political assets 
between the two conflict parties. Alliances with the army allow them to dominate trading 
networks. On the other hand, they need to find a modus vivendi with the other party, the 
Tamil rebels. They thus largely pay the taxes imposed on them by the LTTE. However, the 
example of Vattam has also shown that Muslim communities can be in a fragile position 
being trapped between the lines.  
With regard to political assets, it is especially the Tamil population that suffers from a 
comparative disadvantage, since the armed forces suspect them of collaboration with the 
rebels. At the same time, Tamil civilians face 'freedom fighters' (LTTE) that have imposed a 
strict governance system on their own people that intimidates dissent and collects taxes from 
its own constituency to finance the war. Furthermore, it forcibly recruits young Tamil men 
against their will and that of their families. Especially young Tamil men have thus become 
most susceptible as being targets of both, the LTTE and the army.  
The studies indicate that political assets differ significantly across ethnic lines. However, 
the findings also show that one should be cautious in making generalizations across ethnic 
groups, the like 'Muslims have stronger political assets'. While a general trend can be detected 
from this and the study of Goodhand et al. (2000), that Muslim and Sinhalese households 
tended to have stronger political assets during war time, this may differ within ethnic groups 
as well: The Muslim fishermen in Vattam deliberately avoided any alliance with either army 
or LTTE because they felt squeezed between the lines being positioned directly at the 
borderline with a lot of political instability and violence. Seeking alliance with one side may 
expose them to higher vulnerability towards the other party. In contrast to that, Muslim 
traders in the neighboring villages of Kumpurupitty (in Nilaveli) and of Ithikulam (in the 
market place of Toppur) tended to have strong political assets that allowed them to make good 
profits in trade (see above). These ambiguities show that opportunities to actively seek 
alliances with power holders depend on various factors of which ethnicity is only one, though 
important, factor besides, for example, the very local political geography that can confine the 
options available to people. It also illustrates that conflict can mean opportunities and threats 
at the same time for specific households or actors.  
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5 Conclusion 
The findings of this study indicate that livelihood strategies and outcomes in the war zones of 
Sri Lanka are highly complex, contextual and dynamic. One should be careful in making 
sweeping generalizations across cases and ethnic groups and to relate all behavior and liveli-
hood strategies solely to impacts of the ongoing warfare. The findings broadly suggest that 
households need to exercise a great degree of flexibility in combining their assets in order to 
secure their livelihoods in times of warfare. The challenges posed to households has also al-
tered intra-household gender roles, particularly in Tamil society, where women have to take a 
more active role in economic activities. 
In general, political violence and warfare poses a life-endangering threat to civilians and 
they have to develop radical response strategies to political violence (first pillar), mostly by 
migrating to more secure place, temporarily or permanently. Most studies in Sri Lanka that 
focused on survival strategies of (predominantly Tamil) migrants and internally displaced 
persons in Sri Lanka emphasize the importance of the extended family network as a coping 
strategy (Fuglerod 1999; Mcdowell 1999; Sidharthan 2003). One major concern is that the 
increasing pressure on these family networks may overburden the ability of those outside the 
war zones to buffer the demands of their relatives living in the war zones. The present study 
supports these findings that when households migrate out of the war zones or when they send 
individual household members outside, they have to rely on their social assets. This implies 
that only those who dispose of social assets with links outside of the war zones may be in the 
position to send household members to safer heavens. The poorest of the poor often do not 
have this option, because their relatives also reside within the war zones. 
While social assets based on extended family networks are essential for refugees residing 
outside the war zones, there are a number of cases where political assets and networks with 
influential power holders offer some households living in the war zones opportunities for 
economic gain. While the literature on civil wars mostly investigates the role combatants play 
in war economies and how they use violence to extract economic rents from civilians, this 
study indicates that opportunities are not confined to combatants alone. Similarly, some 
civilians have used or actively worked on establishing political relations with power holders 
in order to derive comparative advantages for their economic ventures. In the material 
discussed above, this is most evident in the case of Kalyanapura where Sinhalese farmers face 
a high political risk of being attacked by the rebels, and at the same time, they seek an even 
stronger alliance with power holders to derive personal economic benefits.  
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Hence, war can be both, a threat and an opportunity. What the literature on civil war and 
political violence often misses is the point that civilians, farmers, fishermen, are not all 
victims, some may also be culprits in the political economy of warfare. However, whether and 
how war poses threats or offers opportunities to civilians is deeply ambiguous, contradictory 
and contextual. Indeed, for some, it may mean both at the same time.  
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